Antitrust exposure arises less from formal agreements than from routine interactions between competitors and from ordinary commercial arrangements.
Per se offences. Agreements among competitors to fix prices, allocate markets or customers, rig bids, or restrict output are unlawful without inquiry into effect. Criminal liability attaches for individuals and organisations, and no business justification is a defence.
No-poach and wage-fixing agreements among competing employers are treated as market allocation and have been prosecuted criminally.
Information exchange. Sharing current or forward-looking price, cost, capacity or wage information with competitors is dangerous, including through trade associations, benchmarking surveys and joint ventures. Historical, aggregated data administered by a neutral third party is the safer structure.
Trade association meetings should follow published agendas, be minuted, and end immediately if the discussion turns to prices, terms, customers or capacity — with the departure recorded.
Rule of reason conduct. Exclusive dealing, tying, bundled discounts, territorial restrictions and most vertical arrangements are assessed on effects and are generally lawful absent market power.
Monopolisation requires monopoly power plus exclusionary conduct; aggressive competition on the merits is lawful.
Documents. Careless internal language about crushing competitors and market share does not create liability but shapes how everything else is read.