Statutory construction begins and often ends with the text, but the tools are more numerous than that summary suggests.
Ordinary meaning at the time of enactment, with dictionaries and usage evidence, unless the term is a term of art.
Whole act. Provisions read together; identical terms presumed to carry the same meaning throughout; and a reading that renders language superfluous disfavoured.
Grammatical canons. The series-qualifier and last-antecedent principles, the rule that general words following specific ones are limited to the same class, and the expression of one implying exclusion of others. These frequently point in opposite directions, which is a fair criticism of their use.
Substantive canons. Avoidance of constitutional doubt; the rule of lenity in criminal statutes; the presumption against retroactivity; the presumption against extraterritorial application; and the requirement of a clear statement for abrogating sovereign immunity or altering the federal-state balance.
Legislative history is used variably. Committee reports carry more weight than floor statements; subsequent legislative history carries little. Courts that begin and end with text nonetheless often consult it to confirm.
Purpose. Where the text is genuinely ambiguous, the statute’s evident objective informs the choice among readings.
Practical advocacy. Lead with text and structure. Purpose and history support; they rarely carry the argument alone.