Fraudsters impersonate vendors or executives and request that payment be sent to a new account. The losses are large, immediate and largely preventable.

The pattern. A compromised or spoofed email account; a request to update banking details, often accompanied by a plausible explanation and urgency; and a payment made before anyone verifies.

The control. Verification by telephone to a number held in the vendor master before the change request, never a number in the email. This single step defeats the scheme as described above, because the fraudster controls the email, not the vendor’s known telephone line.

Supporting controls. Dual approval for banking changes; a hold period before the first payment to new details; confirmation of changes to a second contact at the vendor; and out-of-band verification for any payment above a threshold.

Executive impersonation. Requests from a senior person to make an urgent confidential payment should be verified through a known channel, and staff should be told explicitly that no genuine request will ever prohibit verification.

Response if it happens. Contact the sending bank within hours to request a recall; report to law enforcement, which maintains a mechanism for freezing recent transfers; notify insurers; and preserve the email evidence and headers.

Recovery depends almost entirely on speed. After a few days the funds have moved.